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Do business groups help or hinder technological progress in emerging markets? 
Evidence from India 
 
Abstract: 
Business groups, which are ubiquitous in emerging market economies, balance the advantages of 
characteristics such as internal capital markets with the disadvantages such as inefficient internal distribution 
of resources and suppression of technological and other forms of innovativeness. In this paper, we examine, 
in the Indian context, whether business group affiliation provides an advantage over unaffiliated (or private 
independent) firms with respect to technological progress, which lies at the heart of wider economic growth 
and prosperity. Our results suggest that while business group affiliation did provide an advantage over 
private independent firms at the start of the sample period (2000), this advantage was more than offset by 
the turn of the century. We discuss the implications of our results for economic growth rates in emerging 
market economies. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now well understood that business group affiliated firms can account for a significant proportion of 
private sector firms in emerging market economies. Their existence has been justified in many different 
ways. For example, it has been argued that if capital markets are informationally imperfect then there is 
scope for business groups to come into existence (Ghatak and Kali, 2001; Kali, 2003).  Indeed, if capital 
markets are imperfect, internal accruals of firms may be the dominant source of funds for investment. In 
such cases, existing firms with internal accruals are in a better position to start new business ventures 
(Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008), resulting in the formation of business groups. Similarly, business groups 
may be the optimal outcomes of environments where contract enforcement is costly (Kali, 1999), i.e., where 
they are optimal organisational structures that minimise transactions cost (Granovetter, 1995).1 Similarly, 
business groups can result from expansions of businesses into unrelated industries, in contexts such as late-
industrialising countries where expansion of business activities is much more dependent on ability to use 
contacts than on other capabilities of the firms (Kock and Guillen, 2001).  
 The literature highlights the advantages of resource sharing within business groups; it may result in 
greater innovation and higher productivity in group affiliated firms, in part by weakening the relationship 
between a firm's liquidity and its investment in innovation (Keister, 1998; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010; 
Hsieh et al., 2010). However, it also indicates that, as postulated above, the context matters significantly. 
For example, group affiliated firms are likely to be more innovative in contexts where institutions are weak 
(Chang et al., 2006), i.e., where the benefits from mutual insurance or internal resource sharing are quite 
high. Choi et al. (2011) find a strong positive impact of business group affiliation on patent registration in 
China. By contrast, if business groups foster moral hazard either by providing safety nets or by restricting 
competition, innovation is adversely affected. Mahmood and Mitchell (2004)2 find that while business 
groups in Korea and Taiwan may provide innovation infrastructure, innovation intensity has an inverted-U 
relationship with the market share of business groups. Further, the peak of this inverted-U curve is reached 
early if there are alternative sources of innovation infrastructure.  
                                                          
1 Some researchers have expressed discomfort with the view that business groups are an optimal response to market 
imperfections and weak institutions. They have sought alternative explanations for the existence of this organisational 
form, e.g., in important historical events and subsequent path dependence (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003), and in 
inimitable capability of firms and entrepreneurs for repeated market entry (Guillen, 2000). However, market 
imperfections and institutional weaknesses continue to be the dominant explanation for existence of these groups. 
2 See also Mahmood and Lee (2004). 
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 Over the past two decades, emerging economies have experienced significant changes in their 
economic and institutional environments. To a lesser or greater extent, they have embraced market oriented 
reforms and have attempted to remove distortions in their product, and factor (particularly capital) markets 
(e.g., Kim, Bae and Bruton, 2012). There has also been an attempt at improving the ease with which 
contracts can be enforced and, more generally, at reducing the transactions cost of doing business in these 
countries. The 2012 Doing Business report of the World Bank concludes that "more and more economies 
are focusing their reform efforts on strengthening legal institutions such as courts and insolvency regimes 
and enhancing legal protections of investors and property rights. This shift has been particularly pronounced 
in low- and lower-middle-income economies where 43% of all reforms recorded by Doing Business in 
2010/11 focused on aspects captured by the getting credit, protecting investors, enforcing contracts and 
resolving insolvency indicators" (p. 1). The market imperfection and weak institutions based rationale for 
existence of business groups, therefore, is rapidly disappearing. 
 Can we then argue that business groups continue to be optimal organisational structures on account 
of other advantages that they bestow on the affiliated firms? In particular, do they offer an advantage by 
way of mutual insurance of the affiliated firms (see Aoki, 1984, 1988), thereby enabling group affiliated 
firms to take risk, which is an important component of innovation and entrepreneurship that encompasses 
structural changes in the way in which firms are organised and how they formulate and execute strategy? 
Or does mutual insurance largely results in moral hazard on the part of the weaker firms within the groups 
and a suppression of (technology related) innovation and (wider) innovativeness among the stronger firms?3 
The literature suggests that, with the exception of the Japanese keiretsu, there is little empirical evidence 
from other contexts in support of the mutual insurance hypothesis (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). On the other 
hand, there is evidence to suggest that families in control of business groups do indeed maximize the payoff 
of the group as a whole, often quashing productive activities of some of the member firms to protect obsolete 
investment in other member firms (Morck and Yeung, 2003). Further, stronger firms support weaker group 
members through debt guarantees, equity investment and internal trade, one consequence of which is that 
profitable group members may have to forego profitable investment opportunities (Chang and Hong, 2000).  
                                                          
3 The moral hazard can directly be the consequence of expectations on the part of the weaker group members that they 
would be bailed out if they perform poorly, and also on account of the expectation that business groups may be capable 
of restricting competition through political lobbying or by way of control over key resources or by way of their size 
relative to other firms. 
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Profit is often redistributed from stronger to weaker firms to ensure group survival (Estrin, Poukliakova and 
Shapiro, 2009). And group firms might suffer from over expansion and over diversified into business area 
that is outside their competitive advantage (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). The performance and innovativeness 
of business groups (and hence their affiliates) may, therefore, depend on whether or not the benefits of 
mutual insurance and resource sharing, which decrease over time, outweigh (or get outweighed by) the costs 
associated with moral hazard and suppression of innovativeness among group affiliated firms.4 Seo, Lee and 
Wang (2010), for example, find that performance of business groups in China has declined over time, at 
least partly on account of serious agency costs associated with these groups. 
 In this paper, we contribute to this literature by examining differences in technical change of group 
affiliated firms and unaffiliated firms. The context of our analysis is India, where business groups are 
ubiquitous (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), and yet where we find a large number of unaffiliated firms across a 
wide range of industries which can act as comparators.5 We posit that if mutual insurance and resource 
sharing results in greater innovativeness, whether related to product improvement though internally 
developed and externally sourced technology or through better organizational structure and strategy 
formulation, this should be reflected in greater technical change for group affiliated firms. By the same 
token, if technical change is lower for group-affiliated firms, this is arguably on account of moral hazard 
and hindrance of among group affiliated firms. Further, if the advantages of mutual insurance and resource 
sharing declines with strengthening of local institutions, and if indeed institutions and strengthened over 
time, this should result in reduction of productivity differential between group affiliates firms and 
unaffiliated firms over time, even if business group affiliated firms have an initial advantage. Our results 
suggest that, in the Indian context, business group affiliation was associated with higher technological 
progress relative to unaffiliated or private independent firms in the immediate aftermath of the reforms of 
the early to mid 1990s, but this advantage of business group affiliates was more than offset by the turn of 
                                                          
4 It is now well established in the wider literature on business groups that with reduction in market imperfections and 
improvement in institutional quality, group affiliated firms may indeed lose their advantage over unaffiliated firms. 
Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar (2012) find that group affiliated firms in India experienced less financing constraints 
at the turn of the century, but this advantage vis-a-vis unaffiliated firms was reversed during the first decade of the 
twenty first century, as reforms reduced inefficiency in the Indian credit and capital markets. Similarly, Zattoni et al. 
(2009) find that while business groups in India outperformed other firms in a weak institutional environment, this 
superiority in performance disappear with reduction in market imperfections and improvement in institutional 
environment. 
5 By contrast, the literature on the business group-innovation-productivity link in emerging markets is almost entirely 
focused on Korea, Taiwan and China.  
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the century. Our result is consistent with those reported in other recent papers on Indian business groups, 
e.g., about the waning advantage of their internal capital markets. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we briefly discuss the research 
methodology and the data. In Section 3, we discuss the regression results. Finally, Section 4 reflects on the 
implications of the regression results and concludes. 
 
2. Research methodology and data 
The growing literature on productivity and its growth in emerging market economies has largely focused on 
the role of competition, ownership and financial development in fostering productivity growth (Ayyagari et 
al., 2010; Gorodnichenko et al., 2010). At the same time, it is well understood that there are three different 
courses of productivity growth, namely, improvement in firm level efficiency (e.g., through implementation 
of processes that minimise of wastage of inputs), scale efficiencies and, of course, technological change.6 
Of these, greater risk-taking is perhaps associated with activities that are associated with technological 
change -- investment in research and development, acquisition of new technology and associated changes 
to products and/or production processes -- than with the other drivers of productivity growth. We, therefore, 
focus largely on the impact of business group affiliation on technological progress. However, we also 
examine the impact of this affiliation on efficiency change, which is an important component of TFP growth, 
and on TFP growth itself.  
 The stochastic frontier approach to model production functions facilitates the decomposition of 
(total factor) productivity growth into technological change, change in the efficiency with inputs are 
converted into outputs, and change in scale efficiency. Following Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and 
under the assumption of translog functional form the stochastic frontier of an individual firms i at time t can 
be represented as follow: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
+𝛽𝑡𝑡 +
1
2
𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (1) 
                                                          
6 Girma and Gorg (2006), for example, demonstrate that productivity gains observed in firms that are acquired by 
multinationals is largely on account of changes in technical efficiency and not in the scale of operations. 
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𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝐼, 𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇, N=3. 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the output produced by firm i at time period t, Xnit denotes the inputs (in this case labour 
(l), capital (k) and materials (m), i.e., N = 3) of firm i at time t, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents the normally distributed iid 
error term with zero mean and positive variance, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  denotes firm i's positive and half-normally 
distributed inefficiency at time t. 
 To utilise the panel structure of our data set in this study we adopt the true fixed effect panel 
stochastic frontier model specification as suggested by Greene (2003).  We assume the firm level 
heterogeneity affects a firm's production process in a time invariant fashion, but that it is independent of 
firm-level time-varying technical efficiency.7 This setting is preferred in contexts (such as emerging market 
economies) where there is considerable heterogeneity in firm size, such that production capacity of firms 
might vary significantly and yet be unrelated to the efficiency of the firms. Equation (1) is therefore written 
as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
+𝛽𝑡𝑡 +
1
2
𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes the time invariant firm specific factors that would affect firm level output but not the 
technical efficiency. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  
 Once the parameters of the translog production function are estimated, following Jondrow et al. 
(1982) the inefficiency parameter 𝑢𝑖𝑡 can be predicted as follows: 
?̂?[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡] =
𝜎𝜀
1 + 𝜆2
[
𝜙(𝑧𝑖𝑡)
1 − Φ(𝑧𝑖𝑡)
− 𝑧𝑖𝑡] 
                                                          
7 While it is well understand that firm specific heterogeneities could affect firm production,  in the literature there is 
still no uniform framework on how such heterogeneity should be treated in stochastic frontier estimation. Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) assume that the firm specific heterogeneity can be treated a fixed effect to be included in firm level 
inefficient. Similarly, in Kumbhakar (1990), Pitt and Lee (1982) and Battese and Coelli (1988, 1992, 1995), it is 
captured by a time invariant random inefficiency term.  The models by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Kumbhakar (1990), 
and Pitt and Lee (1982) has been criticised for assuming firm level inefficiency to be time invariant.  Whilst the 
monotonic decaying inefficiency with respect to time period as assumed by Battese and Coelli (1995) has also been 
contended as been restrictive and could lead to extreme results (Greene 2005). Further, Greene (2003) has pointed out 
that the alternative specification of a time-invariant firm specific factor in firm level efficiency is extremely challenging 
to be accurately estimated with volatile likelihood function even under the most favourable scenarios. This makes the 
identification of the key parameters difficult. 
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𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,   𝜎𝜀 = √(𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2), 𝜆 =
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡 =
𝜀𝑖𝑡𝜆
𝜎𝜀
 
Here, 𝜙(. )  and Φ(. )  denote the density and CDF function, respectively, evaluated at 𝑧𝑖𝑡 . Conditional 
estimates, of uit, in turn, enables us to estimate technical efficiency level of each firm during each year of 
the sample period: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(−?̂?[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡]) (3) 
 This, in turn, enables us to decompose total factor productivity (TFP) into efficiency change (EC), 
technical progress (TC) and scale change (SC) (Coelli et al., 2005).  EC represents the improvement in TFP 
that results from improvement in pure technical efficiency, when compared with a constant returns to scale 
(CRS) production frontier, while SC represents the improvement in TFP caused by scale change.8 Finally, 
TC on the other hand represents technological progress made by the firm between the period t and s. 
Specifically, EC, TC and SC between time periods t and s can be written as: 
𝐸𝐶 =
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑠
  (4) 
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
1
2
∑[℮𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑠 + ℮𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡]𝑙𝑛 (
𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑠
)
𝑁
𝑛=1
} (5) 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
1
2
[
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑠
+
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑡
]} (6) 
where 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑠 =
(℮𝑛𝑖𝑠−1)
℮𝑛𝑖𝑠
, ℮𝑖𝑠 = ∑ ℮𝑛𝑖𝑠
𝑁
𝑛=1  and ℮𝑛𝑖𝑠 =
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑠
. Malmquist TFP index is the geometric mean 
of these three components. 
 Using equation (2), we estimate translog production functions for 11 NIC 3-digit Indian industries 
for the 1999-2010 period. The data are taken from the Prowess database that is available from the Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy. This widely used database9 included information on sales, labour cost, 
capital stock and material cost that are required to estimate equation (2).10 It also includes information about 
                                                          
8 The value of SC would be 1 if firm i is producing under CRS, whilst be larger than 1 under increase returns to scale 
and be less than 1 under decreasing returns to scale. 
9  See, for example, Bertrand et al. (2002), Gopalan et al. (2007), Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar (2012), and 
Dharmapala and Khanna (2012). 
10 Other empirical exercises that use Prowess for production function estimation use the same measures of output and 
inputs; see, e.g., Mandal and Madheswaran (2009), Mitra and Sharma (2011) and Kim and Saravanakumar (2012). 
One limitation of this data set is that it requires the use of labour cost as a proxy for labour input in production function 
estimations. However, as noted by Fox and Smeets (2011), even aside from the fact that in some contexts wage bill is 
the only available proxy for labour input, "[a] wage bill specification is also attractive because the explanatory power 
of human capital variables in wage regressions can be low, suggesting unmeasured worker characteristics are also 
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group affiliation of firms, indicators of other forms of ownership such as MNE subsidiaries, first year of 
operation and industry affiliation. The descriptive statistics of the sample of firms for each of these industries 
is reported in Table 1. After dropping observations with missing values, we are left with a sample of 31.671 
firm years. 
 
INSERT Table 1 about here 
 
 The parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier model enables us to generate measures of EC, TC 
and SC as in equations (4)-(6). Next we transform the estimated annual EC, SC and TC into chain-linked 
indices based on the initial year. The logged differences of the linked indices between two years represent 
the percentage growth rate in EC, SC and TC, and the percentage change of the growth in TFP equals the 
sum of growth rate in EC, SC and TC as in Coelli et al. (2005). We then estimate the following regression 
models, to examine the impact of group affiliation on percentage change in TC (TC from here on):11 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝑏3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑡 + 𝑏5𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏6𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (7) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes  TC. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a business group affiliate 
and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the indicator variable for foreign ownership which takes the value of one 
if majority of a firm’s share is controlled by foreigner(s). 𝑍𝑖𝑡 includes the other control factors such as size 
and age of the firm.12 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖  represents industry dummies at 2-digit industry level. We also control for 
investment in research and development (R&D) and off-the-shelf acquisition of technology that are often 
more important in the context of emerging market economies. Since the impact of these investments may 
                                                          
important determinants of labor quality. Further, the wage bill using monthly salaries better weights the contributions 
of part-time and full-time workers than do measures like the number of workers." They also find that "the wage bill is 
potentially a more accurate measure of input quality than the detailed human capital measures." 
11 We also estimate the model with EC (reported in Appendix) and TFP growth (unreported) as the dependent variable, 
but the focus of the discussion in the rest of the paper is largely change in TC.  
12 In the production function, our proxy for output is total sales. Hence, in Equation (7), we should ideally use some 
other measure of size. However, Prowess does not include information on employment (our proxy for labour input is 
the employee wage bill). We, therefore, use as our control for firm size a dummy variable that equals 1 if the total sales 
of the firm is larger than industry average, and 0 otherwise. 
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vary across industries, we interact them with the industry dummy variables, which are also included in  𝑍𝑖𝑡 
in some of the estimations we performed. To control for changes in the institutional environment on account 
of incremental policy initiatives, we also include a time trend t in the model. 13 To explore the possible 
changes of institutional environment on the effect of group affiliation on firm productivity growth we 
include an inter-action term between time trend t and group affiliation indicator. Furthermore, we also 
examine the evolution process of the impact of foreign ownership on TC and other variables of interest. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
denotes the iid error and 𝑏𝑖 denotes firm specific random effect to be controlled in panel regressions.
14 We 
estimate equation (7) above using time series-cross section pooled OLS (with cluster adjustment for possible 
correlations across firm i over time) and panel random effects model. Further, to accommodate possible 
correlation between explanatory variables and the individual random effect, we also the Hausman-Taylor 
estimator. 
 Our regression framework enables us to directly compare the impact of business group affiliation 
on TC（and EC and TFP growth), relative to those of the unaffiliated firm. The interaction between the 
time trend and the dummy variable for group affiliation, in turn, enables us to examine the changing impact 
of group affiliation on TC (and EC and TFP growth) over time. Note that market-oriented and institution 
improving economic reforms were initiated in India in the early 1990s (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; 
Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and Krishnan, 2009). Recapitulate also that we posit that improvements in market 
efficiency and institutional quality reduces the benefits of intra-group mutual insurance and resource sharing, 
such that in such a reformed environment costs associated with group affiliation might outweigh their 
benefits. Given that these reforms take a few years to have an impact on firm performance, therefore, we 
expect group affiliated firms to have an edge over unaffiliated firms with respect to TC (and TFP growth) 
                                                          
13 For other examples of this approach, see Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) and Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar (2012). 
It can be argued that a time trend may also capture other dynamics. Specifically, if either the group or the non-group 
firms have a higher level of technical ability to begin with, its technical change over time may be slow, under the 
assumption that in the long run laggard firms catch up such that there is a convergence. However, this line of argument 
is untenable. First, there is no evidence to support the argument that except perhaps in some “old” sectors like textiles 
technology has reached a steady state to which laggard firms can converge. Second, while there may be relative 
laggards and front runners in a developing country context, it is likely that both these sets of firms are far removed 
from the global technology frontier such that both these sets of firms have considerable scope to experience technical 
change over a relatively short period of time. Finally, our estimates of technical efficiency of group-affiliated and non-
group firms during the first two years of the sample period indicates that the difference in the average technical 
efficiency levels is not statistically significant.   
14 Since group affiliation and foreign ownership are firm specific and time invariant in our dataset the adoption of fixed 
effect panel regression method would obstruct the accurate estimation of the coefficients for these two key variable. 
Hence the use of random effect panel model to estimate Equation (7).  
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during the early years of our sample period, and we expect this advantage to decline (or even get reversed) 
during the later years of this period.  
 The empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 3. 
 
3. Regression results 
The estimates of the translog production function for each of the sectors is reported in Table 2. While it is 
difficult to interpret individual coefficient estimate for translog production functions, the computed values 
of returns to scale, reported in the last row of the table, suggests that the estimates are reasonable. The returns 
to scale for each of these industries is close to 1, which is consistent with the evidence about returns to scale 
in the wider literature, and it is also consistent with past estimates of returns to scale in the Indian context 
(e.g., Bhaumik and Kumbhakar, 2012). 
 
INSERT Table 2 about here. 
  
 Next, using the methodology proposes by Coelli et al. (2005), we compute productivity growth for 
each of these 3-digit industries over the 2000-2010 period, and decompose it into its components, namely, 
SC, TC and EC. These are reported in Figure 1. Since the focus of our analysis is the difference between 
business group affiliated firms -- which may have historically been more suited to the economic and business 
environments in emerging market economies but whose advantage may have waned over time -- and 
unaffiliated or private independent firms, we separately report productivity growth and the contribution of 
its components for these two types of firms. The figures suggest the following: (a) There is considerable 
heterogeneity in productivity growth across industries. However, for many of the industries, positive and 
significant productivity growth is noticed for both types of firms, indicating that there might be significant 
industry effects. (b) While the importance of TC relative to EC in total percentage changes of TFP differ 
significantly across industries, by and large, TC is the more important driver of productivity growth than 
EC.  
 
INSERT Figure 1 about here. 
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 Recapitulate that business group affiliation, which trades off the advantages of resource sharing 
with the disadvantages of agency conflicts, inefficient intra-group resource allocation and innovativeness 
suppression, is expected to have the greatest impact on the technological change component of productivity 
growth, which involves the greatest extent of risk taking. Hence, we compare the 2000-2010 TC for business 
group affiliated and private independent firms in three different ways. To begin with, we use the stylized t-
test. Next, we take into consideration the possibility that the distributions of TC are non-normal, and hence 
use the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test instead. Finally, we use the Kolmogrov-
Smirnov test where the null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from the same underlying 
population. The test statistics and their significance levels are reported in Table 3, and they suggest that 
there is significant difference between technological change over the 2000-2010 period, between the group 
affiliated firms and private independent firms, for most of the industries. 
 
INSERT Table 3 about here. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, we formally test the impact of business group affiliation on technology change 
using Equation (7), which we estimate using cluster adjusted OLS, random effects panel and Hausman-
Taylor  estimators. The regression estimates are reported in Table 4. In each case, we estimate two different 
specifications. To begin with, we regress year-on-year TC on a set of industry dummies, a time trend that 
controls for secular changes in the institutional environment, and dummy variables for business group 
affiliation and foreign ownership. Private domestic firms that are unaffiliated to business groups are the 
omitted ownership category. To  understand how the impact of ownership changes over time, we interact 
the time trend with business group affiliation and foreign ownership. The estimates of this specification are 
reported in columns (1), (3) and (5). Next, we control for other firm specific effects such as firm size and 
firm age.  The estimates of this augmented specification are reported in columns (2), (4) and (6).  
 
INSERT Table 4 about here. 
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 The regression estimates indicate that technological change in India is, to a significant extent, driven 
by industry level factors that could include domestic and international competition, changes in regulations, 
and technology shocks that periodically hit industries. Most of the industry dummy variables have 
statistically significant coefficients. The estimates of the augmented specification in columns (2), (4) and (6) 
also indicate that TC is inversely related to firm size and firm age. Given that larger firms may have greater 
resources for investment in innovation (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000) but may also have longer agency 
chains within the organization, resulting in managerial weaknesses and slower adoption of technology,15 the 
inverse relationship between firm size and TC is plausible. 16 Similarly, given that older firms in India were 
more likely to have strategic inertia and were therefore more likely to find it difficult to adapt to the post-
liberalization environment, and given that the average age of the firms in our sample is 23.25 years, the 
negative relationship between firm age and TC is plausible as well. Finally, the time trend variable has a 
positive and significant coefficient, and the implication in our context that TC is augmented by incremental 
reforms that reduce institutional weakness gradually is quite sensible. Importantly, the signs and significance 
of these estimates are robust across the choice of the estimator. 
 The focus of this paper, of course, is the impact of business group affiliation on TC, and here we 
notice something quite interesting., The business group affiliation dummy itself has a positive and 
significant coefficient, while the interaction between this ownership dummy and the time trend has a 
negative and significant coefficient. In other words, during the first year of the sample period (namely, 2000), 
business group affiliated firms experienced greater TC than private independent firms. However, within a 
short time, this advantage of business groups was eroded and by the third (or even second) year of the sample 
period TC in business group affiliated firms lagged that in private independent firms.17 This is consistent 
                                                          
15 Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2007), for example, suggest that decentralization in 
firm structure helps to improve new technology adoption and productivity. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
decision-making process in most Indian firms, even those unaffiliated with business groups, is fairly centralised on 
account of factors such as family ownership. 
16 Indeed, as pointed out by Syverson (2011), empirical evidence about this relationship is hardly conclusive. 
17 Consider, for example, the panel random effects estimates. In the column (4), the group affiliation dummy has a 
coefficient of 0.13 while the interaction between this dummy and the time trend has a coefficient of -0.05. In other 
words, by the third year of the sample period (i.e., when value of the time trend variables equals 3), the interaction 
term dominates the secular impact of the group affiliation dummy. Similarly, the Hausman-Taylor estimates reported 
in column (6) indicate that the interaction term (-0.06) starts dominating the group affiliation dummy (0.21) from the 
fourth year of the sample period. 
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with available evidence about the erosion of advantage of business group affiliated firms in India with 
respect to financing constraints, over roughly the same time period (Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar, 2012).  
 
INSERT Table 5 about here. 
 
 An important weakness of the specifications reported in Table 4 is that they do not include any 
measure of R&D which is believed to have a significant impact on TC. While the R&D-TC relationship 
may not be strong in emerging market economies, on account of difficulties with absorption of technology, 
among other things, it is nevertheless important to examine whether our results with respect to business 
group affiliation is affected by the inclusion of R&D in the specification. We, therefore, control for R&D as 
a robustness check and the estimates are reported in Table 5. In column (1), we control for internal R&D, 
scaled by total sales of the firms. Further, since the impact of R&D on firm-level TC can differ by industry, 
we include in the specification interactions between the R&D-to-sales ratio and the industry dummies (e.g., 
RD131 is the interaction between the R&D-to-sales ratios of firms and the dummy for industry 131). Since 
R&D is not widespread in emerging market economies, and technology is often purchased off the shelf, 
through licensing arrangements etc, in column (2), we control for the ratio of off the shelf technology 
purchase to sales and industry dummies.18 Finally, in column (3), we include the controls for both in-house 
R&D and off the shelf purchase of technology. Since the estimates reported in Table 4 are robust across the 
choice of estimators, in Table 5 we report the estimates of the panel random effect model alone.19  
 The results indicate that neither in-house R&D nor externally procured technology has a significant 
impact on firm-level TC. This is not particularly surprising, given the emerging market context, and is 
consistent with the recent literature on the impact of technological innovation on firm performance in India 
(Bhaumik, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012). More importantly, for our purposes, the result with respect to the 
impact of business group affiliation on TC is unaffected. The results reported in Table 5 continue to show 
that while business group affiliation may have been advantageous at the start of the sample period, within a 
                                                          
18 In our sample, only 14% of the firms reported R&D expenditure, another 15% purchased technology off the shelf 
through licensing etc, and 7% of the firms both invested in R&D and purchased technology off the shelf.  
19 The Hausman-Taylor estimates are reported in Appendix A1. 
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short period of time the tables had turned and TC was higher, on average, in private domestic firms than in 
business group affiliated firms. 
 In Appendices A2 and A3, we report the regression models that have EC as the dependent variable, 
instead of TC. The results suggest that EC is indeed driven by factors that are different from those that 
influence TC. For example, while TC is unaffected by R&D and off the shelf technology procurement, these 
variables affect EC significantly. In the context of our paper, however, we note that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the impact of business group affiliation and private independent firms on EC. In 
results that are not reported in this paper, we re-estimate the regression models with TFP growth as the 
dependent variable. The estimates for these regression models suggest that, much like in the case of TC, 
which is the dominant component of TFP growth in our sample of industries (Figure 1), the initial advantage 
of business group affiliation is soon more than offset, and from the fourth year in the sample period TFP 
growth in private independent firms exceed that in business group affiliated firms. 
 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Business groups are ubiquitous in emerging market economies, and it has been argued in the literature that 
they are an optimal response to weak institutions and missing markets for resources such as capital and 
managerial talent. As the economic and business environments in these economies change with reforms and 
liberalization, an important question that has to be addressed is whether these organisational forms help or 
hinder economic progress in the new environment. For example, recent research suggest that affiliation with 
business groups and their internal capital markets do not guarantee insurance against financing constraints 
(Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar, 2012). Similarly, globalization of labour markets and provide fast growing 
emerging market firms access to global managerial talent, including returning expatriates (Song, 1997; 
Zweig, 2006). Yet, as the competitive advantage of business groups gets eroded, their internal agency 
problems and strategic may persist. These groups may, of course, acquire new resources and capabilities to 
prospect (Yiu, Bruton and Liu, 2005) to overcome organisational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), and 
hence whether they help or hinder economic progress in the new economic or business environment remains 
and open empirical question.  
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 In this paper, we examine, in the Indian context, whether business group affiliation provides an 
advantage over unaffiliated or private independent firms with respect to technological progress, which lies 
at the heart of wider economic growth and prosperity. Our results suggest that while business group 
affiliation did provide an advantage over private independent firms at the start of the sample period (1997), 
this advantage was more than offset by the turn of the century. To recapitulate, the Indian economy was 
subjected to significant reforms to the real sector (e.g., end of the licensing system and greater import 
competition) and the capital market during the first few years of the 1990s, leading to a reduction in the 
transactions cost of doing business. It is not unrealistic to draw the conclusion, therefore, that with economic 
reforms and liberalization, the average business group (or the average firm affiliated to a business group) 
may have progressively weaker impact on economic growth than its private independent counterparts. If 
significant presence of business groups within industries act as entry barriers for young (and hence 
potentially innovative) firms (Mahmood and Lee, 2004), then the overall cost of the persistence of business 
groups could be higher still. 
 While the caveats associated with generalizing any one set of empirical results remain relevant, our 
analysis suggests that within emerging market economies there may be natural limits to enhancing structural 
growth rate through top-down policy measures. While government initiatives and legislations may change 
the macro-institutional environment in which firms operate, firms themselves may find it difficult to adapt 
in ways that can enable them to make the best possible use of the new economic and business environment. 
At the same time, on account of their historical control over scarce resources, these firms may prevent the 
entry of more nimble and innovative new firms whose structures and actions are optimal for the new 
environment. The ability of emerging market economies to sustain high rates of growth over prolonged 
periods of time, therefore, depends as much on the changes in the nature of the organisations that are engaged 
in production as on the ability of the governments to reduce or eliminate institutional weaknesses. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
NIC code Description Sales Labour cost Capital Material  
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
107 Manufacture of other food products 1214.41 2943.72 124.82 305.10 707.38 2073.15 257.52 829.85 3194 
131 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 952.13 2248.96 109.06 238.14 600.44 2139.04 259.81 658.83 3697 
139 Manufacture of other textiles 1094.93 2769.89 113.29 272.17 697.91 1990.40 259.40 680.16 2195 
201 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilizer and nitrogen 
compounds 
2390.57 7148.75 137.99 404.15 1451.82 4980.00 915.64 4376.94 3508 
202 Manufacture of other chemical products 2356.04 9400.61 161.69 631.94 593.61 2009.60 819.88 4331.84 2311 
210 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and 
botanical product 
1594.61 4150.78 189.79 568.77 658.12 1752.74 495.00 1409.97 3562 
222 Manufacture of plastics products 880.34 2277.76 53.35 127.62 412.95 1199.05 148.58 403.61 2632 
239 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 3302.15 9230.52 194.10 468.70 2105.10 6235.18 1418.37 4155.16 1801 
241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 4925.45 24588.50 337.47 2846.78 2637.20 13111.59 1101.91 4663.36 3520 
282 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 1385.91 3694.42 153.04 392.52 325.92 890.86 203.45 591.14 1804 
309 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 2369.90 8465.18 182.22 413.74 658.97 1742.88 285.96 931.34 3447 
 All industries 2070.80 9926.72 163.13 1025.54 1005.36 5191.43 549.38 2746.02 31671 
Note: All values in millions of Rupees 
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Table 2: Parameter estimation from stochastic frontier, 1999 and 2010 
 NIC 
Code 
107 131 139 201 202 210 222 239 241 282 309 
 Manufacture 
of other food 
products 
Spinning, 
weaving 
and 
finishing 
of textiles 
Manufacture 
of other 
textiles 
Manufacture 
of basic 
chemicals, 
fertilizer and 
nitrogen 
compounds 
Manufacture 
of other 
chemical 
products 
Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal 
chemical and 
botanical product 
Manufacture 
of plastics 
products 
Manufacture 
of non-
metallic 
mineral 
products n.e.c. 
Manufacture 
of basic iron 
and steel 
Manufacture 
of special 
purpose 
machinery 
Manufacture 
of transport 
equipment 
n.e.c. 
  
𝛽𝑘 
0.437** 
(0.174) 
0.279** 
(0.009) 
0.464** 
(0.019) 
0.289** 
(0.014) 
0.140** 
(0.018) 
0.287** 
(0.014) 
0.216** 
(0.016) 
0.093** 
(0.021) 
0.306** 
(0.013) 
0.282** 
(0.019) 
0.425** 
(0.016) 
  
𝛽𝑙  
0.106** 
(0.023) 
0.281** 
(0.010) 
0.144** 
(0.022) 
0.095** 
(0.019) 
0.191** 
(0.022) 
0.279** 
(0.022) 
0.223** 
(0.022) 
0.324** 
(0.022) 
0.266** 
(0.015) 
0.526** 
(0.022) 
0.375** 
(0.021) 
  
𝛽𝑚 
0.537** 
(0.018) 
0.349** 
(0.010) 
0.345** 
(0.022) 
0.520** 
(0.015) 
0.557** 
(0.017) 
0.397** 
(0.018) 
0.514** 
(0.015) 
0.535** 
(0.027) 
0.281** 
(0.014) 
0.275** 
(0.017) 
0.242** 
(0.018) 
  
𝛽𝑘𝑘 
0.085** 
(0.009) 
0.062** 
(0.004) 
0.024** 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.051** 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.113** 
(0.008) 
-0.164** 
(0.009) 
-0.033** 
(0.005) 
0.018* 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
  
𝛽𝑙𝑙  
0.094** 
(0.017) 
0.083** 
(0.007) 
-0.022+ 
(0.013) 
0.030* 
(0.014) 
-0.065** 
(0.013) 
-0.028* 
(0.012) 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
-0.129** 
(0.011) 
-0.091** 
(0.007) 
0.184** 
(0.014) 
-0.028+ 
(0.015) 
  
𝛽𝑚𝑚 
0.096** 
(0.006) 
0.040** 
(0.004) 
0.055** 
(0.003) 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
0.041** 
(0.002) 
0.044** 
(0.002) 
0.055** 
(0.002) 
-0.077** 
(0.013) 
-0.115** 
(0.004) 
0.047** 
(0.007) 
0.051** 
(0.006) 
  
𝛽𝑘𝑙  
-0.012 
(0.019) 
0.029** 
(0.007) 
0.180** 
(0.013) 
-0.048** 
(0.016) 
0.174** 
(0.015) 
0.158** 
(0.014) 
0.059** 
(0.018) 
0.140** 
(0.019) 
0.108** 
(0.010) 
-0.099** 
(0.018) 
0.258** 
(0.017) 
  
𝛽𝑘𝑚 
-0.063** 
(0.011) 
-0.039** 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
0.152** 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.045** 
(0.011) 
0.170** 
(0.012) 
0.172** 
(0.017) 
0.013+ 
(0.007) 
0.120** 
(0.013) 
-0.079** 
(0.015) 
  
𝛽𝑙𝑚 
-0.224** 
(0.019) 
-0.155** 
(0.011) 
-0.204** 
(0.017) 
-0.181** 
(0.012) 
-0.113** 
(0.014) 
-0.146** 
(0.013) 
-0.227** 
(0.017) 
0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.108** 
(0.008) 
-0.218** 
(0.017) 
-0.195** 
(0.018) 
  
𝛽𝑡 
-0.585** 
(0.038) 
-0.143** 
(0.020) 
-0.203** 
(0.042) 
-0.400** 
(0.030) 
-0.082* 
(0.041) 
-0.221** 
(0.033) 
-0.086* 
(0.036) 
-0.336** 
(0.038) 
-0.441** 
(0.032) 
-0.344** 
(0.038) 
0.023 
(0.028) 
  
𝛽𝑡𝑡 
0.538** 
(0.049) 
0.113** 
(0.024) 
0.051 
(0.054) 
0.455** 
(0.036) 
-0.022 
(0.051) 
0.148** 
(0.042) 
0.072 
(0.046) 
0.244** 
(0.049) 
0.224** 
(0.038) 
0.324** 
(0.049) 
-0.055 
(0.035) 
  
𝛽𝑡𝑘 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.037** 
(0.007) 
-0.099** 
(0.014) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
0.052** 
(0.015) 
0.062** 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.102** 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
  
𝛽𝑡𝑙  
-0.049** 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.144** 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.015) 
0.104** 
(0.019) 
0.032+ 
(0.018) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
-0.079** 
(0.017) 
-0.046** 
(0.010) 
0.046* 
(0.019) 
0.083** 
(0.016) 
  
𝛽𝑡𝑚 
0.013** 
(0.014) 
-0.023** 
(0.007) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.143** 
(0.012) 
-0.122** 
(0.013) 
-0.033** 
(0.011) 
0.044** 
(0.017) 
-0.006** 
(0.009) 
0.044** 
(0.013) 
-0.063** 
(0.014) 
            
RTS 1.079 0.909 0.953 0.904 0.889 0.963 0.952 0.953 0.853 1.084 1.042 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Note: Authors' estimation using fixed stochastic frontier method proposed by Greene (2003) (see equation (3)). 
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Figure 1: Rate of change in the components of TFP growth, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
Note: From authors' own calculation. 
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Table 3: Comparing technological change of business group affiliated and private independent firms 
NIC 
code Description 
t-test 
(1) 
Wilcoxon-
Mann-
Whitney 
rank-sum 
test 
(2) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov  
(3) 
107 Manufacture of other food products 
  8.18** 
  (0.00) 
  14.56** 
  (0.00) 
0.28** 
(0.00) 
131 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 
- 7.38** 
  (0.00) 
- 7.34** 
  (0.00) 
0.16** 
(0.00) 
139 Manufacture of other textiles 
  2.85** 
  (0.00) 
  3.19** 
  (0.00) 
0.010** 
(0.01) 
201 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilizer and nitrogen compounds 
  2.19** 
  (0.01) 
  3.58** 
  (0.00) 
0.10** 
(0.00) 
202 Manufacture of other chemical products 
  1.19 
  (0.12) 
- 1.25 
  (0.21) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
210 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical product 
  4.61** 
  (0.00) 
  12.42** 
  (0.00) 
0.29** 
(0.00) 
222 Manufacture of plastics products 
  9.17** 
  (0.00) 
  13.44** 
  (0.00) 
0.37** 
(0.00) 
239 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
  11.68** 
  (0.00) 
  11.43** 
  (0.00) 
0.25** 
(0.00) 
241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
  17.06** 
  (0.00) 
  18.13** 
  (0.00) 
0.35** 
(0.00) 
282 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 
  1.42** 
  (0.16) 
  6.85** 
  (0.00) 
0.22** 
(0.00) 
309 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 
- 4.20** 
  (0.00) 
- 3.21** 
  (0.00) 
0.07** 
(0.00) 
Notes: From authors' own calculation. 
                 ** indicates significant at 1% significant level, which indicates the hypothesis of no difference between group and non- 
             group firms in terms of their TC growth rate can be rejected with 99% confidence. 
            p-value within parentheses. 
(1) reports the t-test for equality of TC growth rate between group and non-group firms in India. 
(2) reports the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test for equality of TC growth rate between group and non-group firms in India. 
(3) reports the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of TC growth rate between group and non-group firms in India. 
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Table 4: Impact of group affiliation on technology change 
 Cluster adjusted OLS Panel Random Effect Hausman-Taylor  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Group 0.06+ 0.15** 0.07** 0.13** 0.14+ 0.21** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Foreign -0.00 0.07 0.01 0.06+ 0.11 0.16 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) 
Time Trend 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Group -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Foreign -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Large  -0.23**  -0.18**  -0.16** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
Firm Age  -0.003**  -0.003**  -0.005** 
  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.00) 
Industry effect YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Constant -0.62** -0.47** -0.51** -0.37** -0.49** -0.35** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) 
N 27717 27658 27717 27658 25344 25289 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Base industry is manufacture of other food products (NIC 107). 
Note: OLS is estimated with clustered standard error at individual level to control for possible individual 
heterogeneity.  The results reported are estimated for 2000 to 2010.  The dependent variable is chain linked change 
rate in technology changes (TC). 
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Table 5: Robustness check: including R&D and off shelf technology purchase as control 
variable (panel random effects) 
 (4a) (4b) (4c) 
Group 0.17** 0.16** 0.17** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Foreign 0.11** 0.12** 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Time Trend 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Group -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Foreign -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D -1.51  -1.51 
 (1.08)  (1.09) 
Off the shelf technology  0.15 0.15 
  (1.24) (1.24) 
Industry effect YES*** YES*** YES*** 
R&D × Industry YES***  YES*** 
Off the shelf technology × Industry  YES*** YES*** 
Constant -0.47** -0.47** -0.47** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 25289 25289 25289 
Sigma_u 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Sigma_e 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Rho (fraction of variance due to u) 0.24 0.24 0.24 
F-statistic 174.81*** 55.94*** 226.33*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Base industry is manufacture of other food products (NIC 107). 
Note: The results reported are estimated for 2000 to 2010. The dependent variable is chain linked change rate in 
technology changes (TC). The F test is for joint significance of R&D or/and off the shelf technology and their 
interaction terms with industry dummies.
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Appendix A1: Robustness check: including R&D and off shelf technology purchase as control 
variable  (Hausman-Taylor) 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) 
Group 0.21** 0.21** 0.21** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Foreign 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Time Trend 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Group -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Trend*Foreign -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Large -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm Age -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D -0.67  -0.69 
 (6.74)  (6.74) 
Off the shelf technology  -2.16 -2.15 
  (2.97) (2.97) 
Industry effect YES*** YES*** YES*** 
R&D × Industry YES***  YES*** 
Off the shelf technology × Industry  YES*** YES*** 
Constant -0.35** -0.34** -0.34** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
N 25289 25289 25289 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Base industry is manufacture of other food products (NIC 107). 
Note: The results reported are estimated by Hausman-Taylor estimator for 2000 to 2010. The dependent variable 
is chain linked change rate in technology changes (TC). The F test is for joint significance of R&D or/and off 
the shelf technology and their interaction terms with industry dummies. 
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Appendix A2: Impact of group affiliation on efficiency change (panel random effects) 
 (4a) (4b) (4c) 
Group 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Foreign 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Time Trend 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time Trend*Group -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time Trend*Foreign -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large -0.24** -0.23** -0.23** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D 1.55*  1.56* 
 (0.73)  (0.71) 
Off the shelf technology  -0.22 -0.21 
  (0.39) (0.39) 
Industry effect YES*** YES*** YES*** 
R&D × Industry YES***  YES*** 
Off the shelf technology × Industry  YES*** YES*** 
Constant -0.16** -0.14** -0.14** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
N 25289 25289 25289 
Sigma_u 0.99 0.97 0.96 
Sigma_e 0.88 0.87 0.87 
Rho 0.55 0.55 0.55 
F-statistic 85.09** 144.01*** 229.28*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Base industry is manufacture of other food products (NIC 107). 
Note: The results reported are estimated for 2000 to 2010. The dependent variable is chain linked change rate in 
efficiency changes (EC). The F test is for joint significance of R&D or/and off the shelf technology and their 
interaction terms with industry dummies.
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Appendix A3: Impact of group affiliation on efficiency change (Hausman-Taylor) 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) 
Group 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Foreign 0.14 0.12 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Time Trend 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time Trend*Group -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time Trend*Foreign -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large -0.25** -0.24** -0.23** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 1.89  1.85 
 (3.97)  (3.92) 
Off the shelf technology  -0.05 -0.05 
  (1.72) (1.71) 
Industry effect YES*** YES*** YES*** 
R&D × Industry YES***  YES*** 
Off the shelf technology × Industry  YES*** YES*** 
Constant -0.23** -0.21** -0.21** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
N 25289 25289 25289 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Base industry is manufacture of other food products (NIC 107). 
Note: The results reported are estimated by Hausman-Taylor estimator for 2000 to 2010. The dependent variable 
is chain linked change rate in efficiency changes (EC). The F test is for joint significance of R&D or/and off the 
shelf technology and their interactions with industry dummies.  
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